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mosquitoes during each subsequent summer. New York City, however,
did not obtain a requisite Clean Water Act ("CWA") permit to
discharge a pollutant into a navigable waterway. No Spray Coalition
("Coalition"), a group of citizen plaintiffs, produced evidence that
New York City sprayed pesticides over bodies of water in violation of
CWA permitting regulations, and sought an injunction against New
York City in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York to stop the spraying. The district court granted New York
City's motion for summary judgment, ruling that New York City's use
of insecticides substantially complied with the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") and at most constituted
mere "technical violations" of FIFRA. The district court reasoned that
Congress intended FIFRA to govern pesticide use, and FIFRA's refusal
to allow citizen enforcement should prevail over the CIA's allowance
of citizen suits. The district court determined the Coalition could not
enforce the CWA provisions under the circumstances. The Coalition
appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
On appeal, the Second Circuit examined the relevant provisions of
the CWA. The CWA's citizen suit provision provides that "any citizen
may commence a civil action" against a party in violation of a CWA
provision. The court found that the provision requiring permits to
dispense pesticides over navigable waters clearly allowed citizens to sue
to enforce its provisions. The court then assessed the relevant FIFRA
provision requiring certain chemicals, including pesticides, to be
registered with the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). Under
FIFRA, the EPA issues a "label" for a registered chemical, and FIFRA
requires a registered pesticide to be used in a manner consistent with
EPA's labeling. Further, FIFRA mandates that only specified agencies
of federal and state governments may bring enforcement actions.
The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasoning,
holding the CWA and FIFRA statutes stand on their own and mean
what they say. Concluding no reason existed to eliminate the CWA's
citizen suit remedy and the CWA authorized the Coalition's citizen suit
to compel compliance with the CWA's terms, the Second Circuit
vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Becky Bye

Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 358 F.3d 174
(2d Cir. 2004) (denying petitions challenging a final rule promulgated
pursuant to the Clean Water Act which attempted to minimize adverse
environmental impacts associated with cooling water intake structures,
but granting petition challenging the rule's allowance of restoration
measures because it conflicts with the Clean Water Act).
Congress amended

the Clean Water Act

("CWA")

in

1972,
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directing the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
to regulate cooling water intake structures at power plants and
factories to minimize adverse environmental impacts such as trapping
("impinging") large organisms against intake points or drawing
("entraining") smaller organisms into the cooling system, both of
which injures or kills the organisms. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded the EPA's first attempt at a
regulation for procedural reasons. After the EPA failed to promulgate
a new rule for years, environmental groups sued and won a consent
decree, pursuant to which the EPA agreed to promulgate regulations
under the CWA by specific deadlines. On December 18, 2001, the
EPA issued the first phase of regulations ("Rule"). The Rule applies to
all facilities constructed after promulgation of the Rule that withdraw
more than two million gallons of water per day and use at least twentyfive percent of that for cooling. Facilities whose cooling water
consumption falls below either of those thresholds are subject to
regulation on a case-by-case, "best professional judgment" basis that
had governed before promulgation of the Rule.
A new facility may comply with the Rule in one of two ways. Under
Track I(1) the intake system must either withdraw less than ten million
gallons daily or reduce its intake to a level commensurate with "closedcycle cooling;" (2) the velocity of water moving through the intake
must be less than or equal to 0.5 feet per second; (3) the facility
cannot withdraw a volume of water in disproportion to the size of the
water body; and (4) the facility must select and implement design and
construction technologies to minimize impingement and entrainment
if the capacity, velocity, and proportionality standards are insufficient.
Under Track II, a facility is not bound by the requirements of Track I
for capacity, velocity, or additional requirements, but must comply
with proportional flow requirements. However, a facility may take any
steps toward reduction provided it can demonstrate that the
technology they employ will reduce the adverse environmental impact
to a level comparable to that which would be achieved by using Track
I's capacity and velocity requirements.
In the first petition brought before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the environmental petitioners
("Environmentalists") asserted that the Rule conflicts with the CWA in
three ways. They argued that (1) Track II sets a lower standard than
Track I, which does not reflect the best technology available; (2) the
variance provision is precluded by statute; and (3) dry cooling is the
best technology available. The Utility Water Act Group ("UWAG")
and the Manufacturers Intake Structure Coalition ("MISC") petitioned
on behalf of industry, and challenged the Rule on eight grounds,
which fall into four categories: the Rule was insufficiently flexible, it
was too vague and malleable, it contradicted the statute, and it was
unsupported by the record.
Under Track II of the Rule, reduction is comparable if the facility
can show that its method will equal at least ninety percent of the
reduction in impingement and entrainment that Track I would yield
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or that its method will maintain a level of fish and shellfish in the water
body substantially similar to the level achievable under Track I. A
facility can accomplish this using restoration measures such as
restocking with fish from a hatchery or creating alternative habitats.
Additionally, a facility must comply with more stringent requirements
for the cooling water intake structure or monitoring requirements that
are reasonably necessary to comply with state law. Also, the Rule
contains a variance provision that allows for the facility to comply with
less stringent requirements than Tracks I or II if compliance would
result in costs disproportionate to what the EPA considered in
establishing the requirements or if it would result in significant adverse
impacts on air quality, water resources, or local energy markets.
EnvironmentalPetitioners
Under the Rule, a new facility may choose between either
complying with Track I's velocity and capacity requirements or
complying with Track II, implementing alternative technologies that
yield comparable results. The EPA argued that the two track system
gives facilities a choice between a fast track with EPA approval and a
more flexible permitting process. The Environmentalists asserted
Track II violates the CWA by allowing compliance with a lower
standard than that required by the best technology available or
through restoration measures unrelated to the location, design,
construction and capacity of cooling water intake structures under
EPA regulation. Additionally, the Environmentalists argued that,
consistent with the case-by-case determination that evolved from the
national, technology-based standards regime implemented by
Congress in the 1972 amendments, either of Track I1's compliance
methods requires a demonstration study.
The Environmentalists first challenged the ninety percent
threshold required by Track I in order to comply with Track II. CWA
section 316(b) appears to consider a single level of performance
applicable to all facilities by requiring a standard based on the best
technology available. The Environmentalists contended that Track II
violates this requirement by allowing facilities to demonstrate only a
ninety percent reduction in impingement and entrainment compared
to what Track I would accomplish. The EPA asserted that Tracks I and
II must reflect the same standard, and that ten percent is an
acceptable margin of error for measuring reductions. The Second
Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend the EPA to leave
industry with only one way of reducing adverse environmental impacts.
Since measuring impingement and entrainment is not always precise,
the use of alternative technologies would require the EPA to make a
judgment call as to the comparability of results to Track I. Therefore,
the court held that it was reasonable for the EPA to designate in the
Rule how much ambiguity and margin of error is permissible and in
compliance in measuring the performance of different technologies.
The Environmentalists also argued that allowing restoration
measures as a means of complying with Track II was inconsistent with
the statute.
The CWA provides for minimization of adverse

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 7

environmental impacts, but restoration measures do not minimize
these impacts, they only correct them. These measures would allow a
facility to impinge and entrain unlimited numbers of organisms
provided the industry took other steps to replace them and to
maintain acceptable water quality.
This was inconsistent with
Congress's intent that the EPA directly regulate the design of intake
structures based on available technology.
The court held the restoration measures provision inconsistent
with both the statute's text and Congress's intent in passing the 1972
amendments to the CWA. Additionally, the court found further
textual support that restoration measures were not an acceptable
means of minimizing the adverse environmental impact of intake
structures in the CWA itself, which counsels against including
restoration measures within the best technology available. Congress
also rejected a proposed amendment to section 316(b) that would
have specifically allowed restoration measures, which further shows
that the EPA's authority does not include the discretion to allow
restoration measures where it was previously disallowed. Therefore,
the court held that the EPA exceeded its authority by allowing
compliance with CWA section 316(b) through restoration measures
and remanded that provision in the Rule.
The Environmentalists also argued that Track II allowed permit
writers discretion in determining percentages of impingement and
entrainment permissible under the best professional judgment
standard which was inconsistent with the current national standard.
The court rejected this aspect of the appeal, determining that permit
writers do not have excessive discretion in determining whether
proposed technology will achieve ninety percent of the reduction
yielded by Track I.
The Environmentalists next argued the Rule conflicted with the
CWA regarding its variance provision. This provision allowed less
stringent alternative requirements than those specified in two
exceptions: if cost is disproportionate to the costs that the EPA
considered in establishing the requirement at issue or if there are
significant adverse environmental impacts on air quality, water
resources or local energy markets. The EPA countered that they
promulgated the Rule under sections 306 and 316(b) of the CWA, and
that because section 316(b) is silent as to variances, the statute is
ambiguous and therefore its variance provision is permissible in light
of similar variance provisions promulgated in the absence of clear
statutory authority that have been upheld by other courts.
The court held that the EPA's interpretation of the statute was
reasonable, but that section 316(b)'s silence with respect to variance
does not equal an unambiguous prohibition. However, in the absence
of a statutory bar, it was reasonable for the EPA to allow variances from
regulations promulgated pursuant to section 316(b) for a regulatory
system that allows flexibility. The court stated that since the EPA may
set less stringent requirements only where the particular facility faces
disproportional compliance costs or there will be significant adverse
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environmental impacts, and the alternative requirements can be no
less stringent than justified by those costs or impacts, then the variance
provision does not exceed the EPA's authority. This is because the
provision guides the permitting authority to consider appropriate
factors in allowing relaxation of the Rule's technology requirements
only as necessary to account for unusual circumstances not originally
considered by the EPA. Accordingly, the court upheld the variance
provision of the Rule.
The Environmentalists next contended that dry cooling was the
best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact because it minimizes impingement and entrainment since it
requires the least amount of water. This is contrary to the Rule, which
calls for a cooling water intake system that must either withdraw fewer
than ten million gallons each day or reduce its intake to a level
commensurate with closed-cycle wet cooling.
Additionally, the
Environmentalists argued that since section 316(b) did not mention
cost or other factors, the EPA could not weigh them when determining
the best available technology. Even if the EPA could consider these
factors, they argued, it abused its discretion in weighing them. The
EPA argued that closed-cycle wet cooling is the best technology
available because (1) dry cooling costs more than ten times as much
annually as closed-cycle wet cooling and it only reduces water intake by
an additional five percent relative to once-through cooling; (2) dry
cooling requires more energy, therefore yielding more undesirable air
emissions; (3) costs of dry cooling would be a barrier for some facilities
and discourage construction of new facilities, which generally have less
of an adverse environmental impact than old facilities; (4) dry cooling
is significantly less effective in warmer climates; and (5) dry cooling is
not technically feasible for some types of facilities.
The court held that the EPA can consider cost and energy
efficiency in determining the best technology available, asserting that
section 316(b)'s cross-reference to section 306 suggests it may consider
factors involved in setting discharge limits when regulating intake
structures, which include cost, environmental impact, and energy
requirements.
Additionally, the court noted that the EPA has
considerable discretion to balance the factors required by statute to set
new source performance standards and they have the authority to
make those determinations.
Industry Petitioners
UWAG first contended that the EPA's focus on impingement and
entrainment was unreasonable. They argued the EPA was incorrect in
assuming that all impingement and entrainment of species is adverse,
and conversely, that some intake structures remove dying or dead fish
from the ecosystem. Therefore, UWAG contended, the EPA should
have sought to regulate impingement and entrainment only where
they deleteriously affect overall fish and shellfish populations, which
can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. The court deferred to
the EPA'sjudgment of how to minimize adverse environmental impact
and held that its focus on the number of organisms killed by cooling
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water intake structures was reasonable and that it considered all the
factors raised by UWAG.
UWAG then challenged the additional design, construction, and
operational requirements of the statute. The requirements called for
regulation of some aspects of intake structures on a site-specific basis.
UJWAG stated that this requirement was vague, inconsistent with EPA's
rationale for regulation, and unsupported by the record. The EPA
argued that the capacity, velocity, and proportionality requirements of
Track I were not enough to minimize environmental impact if a new
facility is located in an area where fish and shellfish require additional
protection. The EPA did not establish a national standard based on
the additional technologies required in these situations, and instead
required that, to further reduce impingement and entrainment, the
new facility research and implement the technologies appropriate to
its design and location as part of the permitting process. The court
held that requiring those technologies was consistent with the statutory
mandate to minimize adverse environmental impact, and fell within
the realm of the EPA's expertise. Accordingly, the court held that the
EPA's decision to regulate some aspects of cooling water intake
structures on a case-by-case basis was within its authority and
reasonable.
UWAG then argued that there was insufficient support in the
record for Track I's through-screen velocity limit of 0.5 feet per
second, and instead contended that the relevant velocity is the
approach velocity, stating that this is the point that fish may still be
able to escape. UWAG stated that the regulation on through-screen
velocity adds an unnecessary measure of stringency to the regulation.
The EPA countered that a through-screen velocity was the appropriate
measure because it is easier to measure accurately, many new facilities
are designed to meet through-screen velocity measurements, and it
provides a margin of safety. The court held the EPA's choice of
velocity limit was reasonable.
UWAG next argued the proportional flow limitations of the Rule
were not supported by the record. It argued that, given capacity limits,
these proportional flow limitations were redundant, rested on an
unsupported assumption that withdrawing a certain percentage of
water equals withdrawing the same percentage of larvae and eggs, were
arbitrary, effectively eliminated lakes and reservoirs from available
water bodies because any withdrawal disrupts natural thermal
stratification, were not technologically feasible, and were chosen
without regard for cost. The court held the EPA did not act arbitrarily
or capriciously in choosing the proportional flow limitations since (1)
the number of entrained organisms was closely linked to the amount
of water passing through the intake structures; (2) the percentages
chosen were based on the EPA's conclusion that they are
overwhelmingly achievable for new facilities, as they can chose their
location; (3) most existing facilities meet the requirements; and (4)
that the EPA specifically considered cost and found that the limits
were economically practicable for the industry as a whole. The court
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stated that although the EPA recognized that choosing precise limits
involved a matter of judgment, it saw no reason to substitute their
judgment with the industry's, nor to remand this aspect of the Rule
because it involved an educated guess.
UWAG and MISC both argued the Rule illegitimately imposed
additional requirements as a means of ensuring compliance with state
law, arguing that the EPA lacked statutory authority to impose state
law-based requirements in the federal regulation. MISC also asserted
the EPA failed to provide notice of and an opportunity to comment on
the state law compliance provision before promulgating the Rule. The
EPA argued that the provision was merely a reminder to permitting
authorities of the authority preserved to states under other statutory
provisions, and by itself, imposed no additional requirements. The
court held this was a reasonable exercise of the EPA's authority under
the CWA to remind permitting authorities of the relevance of state
law. Additionally, the court concluded that the provisions, as well as
the statute itself, fairly apprised interested persons that facilities could
be held to requirements not yet specified based on more stringent
state law standards.
MISC then contended the EPA lacked statutory authority to
regulate below-threshold structures on a case-by-case, best professional
judgment basis, and that the EPA failed to give proper notice of and
an opportunity to comment on this provision. MISC argued the
regulatory approach to below-threshold structures exceeded the EPA's
authority to regulate through new source standards of performance, as
provided in section 316(b), and otherwise contradicted the statute's
provision with respect to case-by-case regulation. The EPA contended
smaller facilities are better regulated on a case-by-case basis, and that
the determination of what is best and available as to location, design,
construction and capacity of these structures is best determined this
way, as it was determined for all facilities before the Rule.
The court concluded that there was no textual bar in sections 306
or 316(b) to regulating below-threshold structures on a case-by-case
basis. The CWA does not forbid the EPA from addressing certain
environmental regulations on a case-by-case basis where categorical
regulation is technologically unfeasible or when it is consistent with
Congress's overriding goal of improving water quality. Therefore,
where the EPA is justified in not regulating uniformly, it should not
have to avoid all regulation, and it is reasonable for the EPA to
regulate on case-by-case basis. The court also ruled that as to the
notice and comment objection, the Federal Register indicates that
regulation on a case-by-case basis is possible.
MISC then argued the re-permitting process violated the statute by
requiring technologies beyond those designated as the best technology
available at the specific time the EPA granted the new facility's original
permit. MISC also contended that this provision conflicted with
section 306(d), in which Congress included a clause exempting new
facilities meeting existing discharge requirements from any more
stringent standards of performance for a maximum period of ten
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years. The court held that the provision in the Rule that allowed for
the review of the performance of the technologies implemented and
or different design and construction
additional
requiring
technologies, if needed to minimize impingement and entrainment,
was valid, since nothing in the statute forbids the EPA from reevaluating these specific requirements, which are set on a case-by-case
basis, during the re-permitting process. The court also held that the
provision did not conflict with section 306(d), since the statute did not
unambiguously compel the EPA to grandfather in new intake
structures.
MISC finally contended that the below-threshold, state law, and repermitting aspects of the Rule, which required case-by-case
determinations, were inconsistent with the EPA's older regulations
that did not address intake structures. The court held that the EPA's
failure to formalize its approach until the promulgation of the Rule
was irrelevant, since rulemaking is the process by which the EPA
explains the rule as it enforces it.
Therefore, the Second Circuit granted in part and denied in part
the Environmentalists' petition. The court denied UWAG's and
MISC's petitions in full, and remanded to the EPA the provisions of
the Rule that allows compliance through restoration measures.
Stacy Hochman

THIRD CIRCUIT
Raymond Proffitt Found. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 343
F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that United States Army Corps of
Engineers' alleged failure to comply with its duty under the Water
Resources Development Act to include environmental protection as
one of its primary missions was subject to judicial review, but its
decision to generally reproduce natural flows in river was not arbitrary
and capricious).
Raymond Proffitt Foundation and Lehigh River Stocking
Association ("Foundation") brought an action against United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, asserting the Corps violated
the Water Resources Development Act of 1990 ("WRDA") by not
including environmental protection as one of the missions for the
Walter Dam. The Foundation further asserted the Corps did not fulfill
its environmental protection mission because it released large amounts
of water during high flow periods, and failed to store water during
high flow periods to release during low flow periods. The district
court found that because WRDA did not provide any law to apply to
the facts of the case, the Corps' actions were not subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore granted

